Butti, Michele, Caffini, Matteo, Merzagora, Anna Caterina, Bianchi, Anna Maria, Baselli, Giuseppe, Onaral, Banu, ...
Cognitive activity is related to important changes in the local blood flow level and in the oxygenation of the blood. These two effects lead to a modification of the optical properties of the...
Interacting reinforced-urn systems (2004)
Paganoni, Anna Maria, Secchi, Piercesare
We introduce a class of discrete-time stochastic processes generated by interacting systems of reinforced urns. We show that such processes are asymptotically partially exchangeable and we prove a...
Persistently Good Strategies for Nonleavable Stochastic Games With Finite State Space (1997)
Piercesare Secchi, William D. Sudderth, Giovanni Dosi
The notion of persistently optimal strategy in gambling theory is analogous to that of subgameperfect equilibria in game theory. We prove the existence of persistently ffl-optimal strategies for the...
Problems in two-person, zero-sum stochastic games /--by Piercesare Secchi. (1995)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Minnesota, 1995.
Income Thresholds and Income Classes
Conchita D'Ambrosio, Pietro Muliere, Piercesare Secchi
This paper proposes a method for detecting income classes based on the change-point problem. There is an increasing demand for such a method in the literature. Computation of polarization indices...
A numerical study for comparing two response-adaptive designs for continuous treatment effects
Anna Paganoni, Piercesare Secchi
Response adaptive designs, Clinical trials, Urn schemes,
On the existence of good stationary strategies for nonleavable stochastic games
This paper discusses the problem regarding the existence of optimal or nearly optimal stationary strategies for a player engaged in a nonleavable stochastic game. It is known that, for these games,...
Piercesare Secchi, William D. Sudderth
There exists a Nash equilibrium (-Nash equilibrium) for every n-person stochastic game with a finite (countable) state space and finite action sets for the players if the payoff to each player i is...
N-Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous payoffs
Piercesare Secchi, William D. Sudderth
Every n-person stochastic game with a countable state space, finite action sets for the players and bounded, upper semi-continuous payoffs has an -equilibrium for every >0.